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The present essay focuses on the effectiveness of Portuguese public schools’ provision of 
7th, 8th and 9th grades, using data from the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science 
for 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12. At least two school types offer these grades: Basic 
and Secondary. Based on previous findings, a production function is estimated for 9th 
grade students in the regular academic track, including a variable that indicates the 
specific school type attended by each student. After concluding that Basic Schools add 
more value, some explanations are presented as well as recommendations and possible 
further research. 
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Education is an investment which has positive externalities for societies, as it is a key 
factor for countries’ welfare and individuals’ productivity. It constitutes a valid factor in 
explaining the behavior of wages1, labor market situation and GDP growth rate 
(Hanushek and Kimko 2000), since it leads to the production and accumulation of human 
capital (Becker 1993).  
In an effort to provide a deeper knowledge of the effect of certain inputs in educational 
outcomes, and consequently what works best, the educational production process has 
been extensively researched, nevertheless results are not always consistent. At the heart 
of the educational debate lies one aspect of great interest, focused by major international 
organizations such as UNESCO and OECD: effectiveness.  
Within the Portuguese education system, as in several others worldwide, a non-deeply 
explored event takes place, which can be evaluated from the point of view of its 
effectiveness: the dual provision of 7th, 8th and 9th grades. Since 1986, Portuguese Basic 
Schooling includes 9 years, from 1st to 9th grades divided into three cycles: the first with 
four years, the second with two and the last with three years. In 2012, compulsory 
education changed to 12 years, including Basic and Secondary Schooling. Primary 
Schools are responsible for teaching the first four years, Basic Schools the two, and 
Secondary Schools the last three. However, the 7th, 8th and 9th grades are offered by both 
Basic and Secondary Schools. Thus, a student can either attend this cycle in a school that 
also offers 5th and 6th grades or in a school that provides high school as well. 
Consequently, one is in the presence of two school types that offer these three: Basic 
Schools, with classes from the 5th to the 9th grade and Secondary Schools, which provide 
                                                          
1There is empirical evidence that more years of education are associated with higher expected income.  
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from the 7th to the 12th. Both school types teach exactly the same subjects and contents to 
pupils from the common grades, preparing them for the 9th grade national exams2. 
Moreover, when looking at the characteristics of these two school types one can infer that 
Secondary Schools have teachers with higher education and experience, as well as 
students with better prior achievement. However, in these schools students may be more 
exposed to risky-behavior and school staff control over class attendance may be lower. 
Hence, first of all, differences between Basic and Secondary Schools will be evaluated 
by their significance; afterwards one has to assess if school type plays a role in explaining 
better results. If it does, possible explanations should be suggested. 
The question under analysis is: should the Portuguese system re-define the allocation of 
the 3rd cycle to one of these school types or are there no systematic differences in school 
outcomes between Basic and Secondary Schools in the 7th, 8th and 9th grades? 
In the next two sections some context is provided through a brief description of the 
evolution of the Portuguese Educational System as well as a revision of the literature on 
school effectiveness. Section IV exposes the econometric framework, followed by dataset 
description. Section VI discusses results on the educational production function, which 
can be compared to the results reached in section VII. Finally some conclusions and 
limitations are presented, along with further research topics. 
II. Evolution of the Portuguese Educational System3 
In the second half of the 20th century, three phases can be distinguished concerning the 
Portuguese educational system: in the first decade, there is a process of accommodation 
of the system in place since the 1930’s to the socio-economic reality of the post-war 
                                                          
2 In Portugal, course contents taught in public schools during compulsory schooling are set nationally and national exams are 
standardized. 
3 Based on reports from the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science and Eurydice as well as Alice Mendonça studies. See 
References section for more details. 
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period; the second, from 1960 to 1974, when the government understood the educational 
delay of the country; and the last, until 1997, in which qualitative and quantitative 
transformations took place. 
In the 1960’s, under the dictatorship regime of Salazar, compulsory schooling increased 
from 4 (3 for girls) to 6 years, corresponding to primary education. In January of 1970 
the Ministry of Education, Veiga Simão, tried to launch the foundations of a system that 
truly implemented compulsory and democratic schooling. He defended that education 
should be made available to all Portuguese in a meritocratic basis, in order to allow the 
more capable to integrate society’s elite, independently of social-economic determinants. 
In 1973, a modern and democratic policy regarding the educational system is approved 
and Instituto da Acção Social Escolar (IASE) was created to give social support to those 
who had intellectual capacities and wanted to pursue their studies. However, this reform 
was never totally implemented due to limitations, such as the opposition of more 
conservative sectors in the political system, human and material resources, along with the 
beginning of the revolution in 1974 and the financial crisis of 77/78. After the 25th of 
April of 1974, a democratic state is implemented and the first measure taken was the 
standardization of compulsory schooling for all students, which comprised the first six 
years.  
In 1975, the 1st cycle of Curso Geral do Unificado is created to unify high school and 
technical school. It included three mandatory grades (nowadays 7th, 8th, and 9th), being 
the first two years common to all, while the last one offered some electives. Three years 
later, two more grades were “added”, which intended to continue vocational education 
started in 9th grade. High school was created in 1980, comprised of three grades,  and only 
set as mandatory in 2012. 
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Basic Schooling as we know it today starts only in 1986. It is universal, compulsory and 
free, comprising 9 years and 3 sequential cycles. In this way, 7th, 8th and 9th grades are 
now part of the 3rd and last cycle of Basic education. During this adjustment Secondary 
Schools were already offering the three grades under study. When they become part of 
mandatory and Basic education Basic Schools start providing them as well, while 
Secondary Schools start offering high school. Therefore, this situation arose according to 
school needs and nowadays at least two types of schools offer 7th, 8th and 9th grades: Basic 
Schools, which offered from the 5th to the 9th, and Secondary Schools, from the 7th to the 
12th grade. Additionally, many other combinations were possible and exist until today, 
but with smaller representation in “schools population”, as one can see from the table1 
below.  
Table 1: School Types in MISI dataset 
School Type (grades) 2006/07 2007/08 2008/08 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total 
Basic (5th-9th) 574 542 516 508 474 465 3079 
Secondary (7th-12th) 287 262 253 259 248 248 1557 
Integrated (1st-12th) 4 7 15 6 16 15 63 
Partially Integrated  
(1st-9th) 
92 104 116 125 129 142 708 
Basic with high school  
(5th-12th) 
80 106 112 128 132 143 701 
Total 1037 1021 1012 1026 999 1014 6109 
 
Independently of the school type, every student in the regular academic track needs to 
pass a Mathematics and a Portuguese national standardized exam in order to finish 9th 
grade and Basic School. Each exam has two calls, so a student failing in the first has the 
chance to retake it. 
In 1991, in an experimental setting – that turned out to be permanent –, a new model of 
management of educational system appears: geographical sets of schools. In more recent 
years, these organizational sets – called agrupamentos – start combining grades within 
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schools of the set according to its needs, number of students and size of infrastructures 
for instance, leading to cases in which the primary school of a set offers classes until the 
5th grade and the Basic School from the 6th to the 9th for example. Moreover, it is possible 
that the grades offered by each school change between academic years. All these events 
and possibilities must be taken into account when building the econometric framework. 
III. School Effectiveness: a review of the Literature 
As exposed in the previous sections, the present essay focuses on a question of 
effectiveness related to the provision of 7th, 8th and 9th grades by public schools. 
Effectiveness and efficiency of the education system are closely related. In an abstract 
sense, efficiency explains the relation between inputs and outputs in a production process. 
In contexts like the education setting, characterized by multiple inputs and outputs, a 
situation can be characterized as efficient when it is not possible to produce more of some 
output without reducing another. Hence, this concept is about the optimal use of 
resources, and an improvement in it leads to an improvement of society’s welfare. Its 
indicators are thus economic in nature; public expenditure, expenditure by pupil or the 
level of education can be considered as such. 
On the other hand, effectiveness has to do with the ability of school systems to achieve 
its institutional goals (F. Cornali 2012) as: “teaching general and abstract knowledge” and 
transmit “cognitive methods and thought patterns”. Therefore, its indicators refer to 
observable outputs of the system and to achieved outcomes, such as the number of 
graduates in a given school year and students’ test scores, respectively. Note that 
improving efficiency of the system and/or effectiveness of schools may yield high returns, 
since either a best allocation of inputs or better learning outcomes generates more human 
capital, which is a relevant factor for the success of modern societies. Contrarily, 
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inefficiency can be due to the lack of knowledge, in the sense that policy makers do not 
know what works best. 
Many studies on school effectiveness focus on school size, school structure and 
autonomy. Although size is not a direct causal factor affecting school quality, it is 
indirectly related to academic outcomes through its relation with other variables. For 
instance, J. R. Slate and C. H. Jones (2005) revise several papers on the effects of this 
variable and point out the curvilinear relation between effectiveness and size4, arguing 
that initially increasing school size may have positive effects in educational outcomes, 
but as size continues to rise the point of diminishing returns will be reached. The authors 
document the lack of consensus on the effect of school size on students’ achievement, 
however when using grade level as a mediating variable Friedkin and Necochea (1988) 
found that large schools in California were associated with higher achievement for 12th 
grade students and smaller schools with better achievement for students in 3rd, 6th and 8th 
grades. Finally, larger schools seem to have teachers with higher qualifications, more 
special-education teachers and fewer teachers teaching out of their certified fields; while 
smaller schools have, on average, lower dropout rates and fewer disciplinary problems, 
higher attendance and graduation rates.  
School size is also linked to accountability through parental involvement, since it is 
greater in smaller schools (Meier 1996; Walberg 1992). This increases monitoring of 
teaching staff performance by parents, making school accountable. Accountability may 
provide sufficient incentives for schools to improve performance, raise staff motivation 
and parental involvement through information dissemination and “name-and-shame” 
mechanisms. Actually, there is evidence of a positive correlation between parental-
                                                          




teacher relations and students’ attainment (Thomas 1987). Another way to make schools 
accountable is through standardized tests, whose results are public, since in this way 
parents and police makers are able to identify over and underperforming schools.  
Both Basic and Secondary Schools subject their 9th grade students to the same national 
standardized exams thus, if one type of school is in fact better than the other in preparing 
students for exams – e.g. uses a more effective teaching-to-the-test method –, 
accountability would be part of the driving mechanism, assuming parents’ can choose 
schools. In what concerns school choice, according to Portuguese Law, students are 
allocated to the public school that is closest to their home or parents’ workplace. Parents 
can only choose the school if the closest Basic and Secondary schools are equally near. 
Additionally, parents have developed mechanisms to go over this law when the latter 
situation does not occur.  
Another intensely analyzed topic in school effectiveness literature is school structure, as 
mentioned before. School administrative structure, autonomy and accountability are 
usually accessed together in comparative studies, as different types of schools have 
different combinations of the three. S. Machin and O. Silva (2012) assess the effect of 
different school structures within the English education system – namely voluntary-
controlled, voluntary-aided, foundation and community schools – on pupils’ 
performance. These four structures differ in the composition of their school governing 
body, autonomy of students’ admission and employment decision-making. There are 
similar studies for American charter schools and Swedish free-schools. The argument 
behind the positive impact of autonomy in educational attainment is the following: if 
schools are allowed to differentiate their curricula, students can choose the one that better 
satisfies their needs, and if parents can choose the school in which to enroll their children, 
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good schools will attract more students and expand, while the opposite will happen to 
underperforming schools. One should keep in mind that in public Portuguese schools 
there is virtually no autonomy of teacher allocation and rewarding; it only applies to 
private schools, which are out of the scope of this essay. Additionally, public schools 
follow a national program for each mandatory course; the only possibility to differentiate 
is in extra-curricular activities. 
IV. Econometric Framework 
The most used measure to compare school performance and assess the effects of school 
structure, size or even public versus private nature in the literature are test scores in 
standardized tests. Taking the latter into account, and given the data available, the more 
suitable measure to evaluate the effectiveness of each school type regarding the provision 
of 7th, 8th and 9th grades is student performance in standardized national tests of 
Mathematics and Portuguese, which take place in the last year and evaluate all learning 
contents defined for the three grades. This measure is strongly influenced by contextual 
factors and students’ prior level of achievement. For this reason, controls for family 
background, pupil’s characteristics as gender, 1st language and a measure of previous 
attainment should be included when using test scores as dependent variable. Moreover, 
between-school comparisons may be restricted to schools that operate in similar context, 
for example serving similar student populations. Then, district dummies corresponding 
to student residency area need to be introduced5. 
School specific characteristics will also be introduced, since there is evidence that they 
may have a significant impact on students’ achievement. Hence, variables related to 
                                                          
5 Portugal is divided into districts, which include municipalities, which in turn are constituted by parishes. It may be the case that at 
least one school of each type exists in the same municipality; but dummies for municipalities are not statistically significant, potentially 
due to the low variability and number of observations in each one. For this reason district dummies were used instead. 
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school size, proportion of girls, average teachers’ education and experience in the school 
are included in the regression. Furthermore, a measure of peer effects will also be 
incorporated. 
To account for the type of school providing educational services a dummy, T, that takes 
value 1 for Basic Schools and 0 for Secondary Schools was created. The value of the 
dummy can vary for the same school between academic years due to allocation decisions 
made by the geographic set to which each school belongs.  
Ergo a first approach is to regress the following by OLS: 
9𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽26
𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑠𝑡, 
where the dependent variable is student i‘s score in exam h (either the Mathematics or 
Portuguese) at school s and academic year t; X is a set of student controls; 6th score 
corresponds to the test score in either Mathematics or Portuguese 6th grade exam; W to a 
vector of school s characteristics at academic year t; T is the variable of interest that 
accounts for school type and t corresponds to academic year fixed effects. This last 
variable was included to account for the fact that exam questions, evaluation criteria and 
even contents6 change between academic years as well as their difficulty7.   
The presented framework reveals how effective each school type was in preparing 
students for each exam, given pupils’ observed features and allocation of available 
resources. 
V. MISI Database and Descriptive Results 
The more complete dataset available for the Portuguese educational system in what 
concerns students’ and schools’ characteristics is MISI – a micro database from Direcção 
Geral de Estatística da Educação e Ciência (DGEEC), made available by the Portuguese 
                                                          
6 Mathematics contents taught in Basic education changed in the sample period, particularly in 2011/12. 
7 Between calls in the same academic year the only factor plausible to vary is difficulty. 
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Ministry of Education and Science. This dataset has information regarding public schools 
located in the mainland of Portugal for six academic years, from 2006/07 to 2011/2012. 
Regarding students’ characteristics that may be used as controls, MISI provides six files, 
one for each academic year with students from all grades. As this essay focuses on the 
provision of three specific years, with the last corresponding to the end of Basic 
education, when students take their Mathematics and Portuguese national exams, the 
emphasis will be on 9th grade pupils. Moreover, students in both alternative and special-
education tracks were excluded for comparability reasons, leaving only students in the 
regular academic track. 
From each of the six files, variables regarding individual student features were built, 
namely: gender (1=male), if he has access to a computer and internet at home8, if the 
student failed, abandoned or dropped out the 9th grade8, if his mother tongue is 
Portuguese8, his immigrant status9, the number of times he failed grades before showing 
up in the dataset in 9th grade10, the level of school subsidy received by the student11 and 
the degree of family allowance, his parents’ education12, job market situation13 and 
occupation14. Still for each academic year, variables as the proportion of girls in the 
school, school size, joint size of 7th, 8th and 9th grades along with its proportion in the 
whole school and size of 9th grade alone were computed for each school. Lastly, since 
                                                          
81=yes. 
9Takes value 0 if the pupil and at least one of his parents are Portuguese, 1 or 2 if he is a 2nd or 1st generation immigrant, respectively. 
10This variable was built by first calculating the student’s age at the time he is on the 9th grade for the first time in the database 
(subtracting from the corresponding academic year the year in which he was born) and, after, subtracting 14 from its age. According 
to Portuguese Law governing compulsory schooling, a student who never repeated and was 6 years old by 15 September is 14 when 
reaches 9th grade; those who became 6 after 31 December have 15 when they get to 9th grade; and those who turn 6 in-between are 
either 14 or 15 in 9th grade, depending on their parents’ decision. These possibilities were taken into account in the computation of 
grade repetition of each student given the month in which the student was born.  
110=none, 1=low, 2=high. School subsidy level is intimately related to family allowance degree, which goes from 1 to 6 and the higher 
the degree, the bigger the allowance.   
120=up to 9th grade, 1= high school or bachelor degree of 3 years, 2=undergraduate of 5 years or post-graduate of 1 or 2 years usually, 
3= master degree or PhD.    
130=unemployed, 1=stay at home parent, 2=student, 3=retired, 4=employee, 5=self-employed, 6=employer.  




there was no indication of school type already defined in the dataset, two variables 
indicating the highest and lowest grades offered by each school were created. Based on 
them it was possible to define which schools were (truly15) Basic and Secondary in each 
academic year. In this way, the situations created by schools’ geographical sets do not 
interfere; newer, less representative grade combinations were excluded. 
The next step was to append all six student treated files and match each observation to its 
test scores, which were provided by Júri Nacional de Exames (JNE). The latter database 
had information on Mathematics and Portuguese tests scores16 from national exams 
conducted in 9th and 6th grades. The first pair of test scores, regarding 9th grade, was used 
as dependent variable to measure effectiveness of each school type and the second pair to 
control for past achievement, since education is a cumulative process. Furthermore, note 
that, even though 6th grade exam was implemented in 2001, data on that is only available 
after 2006. As a result only students from the last three academic years – 2009/10, 
2010/11 and 2011/12 – have these test scores available in JNE database.17 
At this point only school characteristics are missing. MISI provides teachers’ 
characteristics in a separate file, such as teacher’s gender, education18, seniority in days, 
weekly load of teaching and study support19 (in some cases, divided by cycles20) and, of 
course, the school to which they were allocated. Ergo, averages were taken across 
teachers of the same school, with the condition that they had a lecture schedule assigned. 
                                                          
15In the sense that only offered from the 5th to the 7th grades or from the 7th to the 12th. 
16 For the 9th grade the score goes from 0 to 100; for 6th grade from 1 to 5. 
17 The data is then restricted to students who took the 6th grade exam and for who the score is available. The proportion of repeaters 
in the two types of schools under analysis, before and after imposing this restriction, are very similar hence not only students that 
failed in past years are erased, preserving sample constitution.  
18Initially this variable had 23 categories that were summarized into 5: 0=none, 1=up to 9th grade, 2=up to high school, 3=bachelor 
degree of three years, 4=undergraduate of five years or post-graduate of one or two years, 5=master degree or PhD. Only the highest 
and more recent education was included for each teacher. 
19Notice that students’ weekly load of classes of each course is centrally determined, so that all students have the same weekly load 
of each course in all schools. However, teachers’ load is defined inside a range according to school needs, varying between teachers. 
20 Cycle 0 corresponds to pre-school, 1st cycle to primary school, 2nd cycle to 5th and 6th grades, 3rd cycle to 7th, 8th and 9th grades and 
finally high school to 10th, 11th and 12th grades. 
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This procedure allowed the creation of aggregate measures by school that could be 
matched to each school in the already built students’ dataset. Other variables were created 
as relative study support to the 3rd cycle21; the proportion of teachers with bachelor, 
undergraduate or master degree in the school as well as average years of experience of 
teachers by school. 
Finally, the students’ database was matched with school characteristics. Thus, the sample 
is constituted by 9th grade students, who attended school in the mainland of Portugal, in 
the regular academic track between 2009 and 2012 and took the 6th grade national tests 
in 2006 or after. The sample size is 289.139 students: 105.826 in Secondary Schools and 
183.313 in Basic Schools.  
At this stage it becomes possible to compare Basic and Secondary Schools in terms of 
size, students’ and average teachers’ characteristics, among others22. Starting with the 
dependent variable of the model, the average score of the 9th grade national exam is higher 
in Secondary Schools comparatively to Basic for both Mathematics and Portuguese, by 2 
points; however standard deviations are lower for Basic Schools. Tests for difference in 
means were performed and the null of equality of average scores between the two school 
types was rejected for all usual significance levels. 
The control used for prior achievement – standardized 6th grade test score – has a higher 
average for students in Secondary Schools and, even significant at usual levels, the 
difference between the two school types is marginal. 
In what concerns family background, average parents’ education is higher for students in 
Secondary Schools and less students seem to have unemployed parents. Accordingly, the 
                                                          
21This variable was calculated by dividing “total weekly hours of support provided by the school” by “the number of students in 7th, 
8th and 9th grades”. Total hours of study support in each school is the sum of each teacher’s weekly contribute. 
22 Descriptive statistics in appendix I. 
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average of school subsidy, which is related to family income, is higher in Basic Schools 
and this difference is statistically different from zero at usual significance levels. From 
the previous analysis one can infer that Secondary Schools have students with “better 
endowments”, who also have higher scores in national exams.  
Gender distribution, and consequently proportion of girls, is very similar between the two 
school types. Secondary Schools have more students in the 3rd cycle and 9th grade than 
Basic. As mentioned before, smaller schools tend to favor parental involvement. 
Teachers’ average education and experience is higher in Secondary Schools, namely the 
proportion of teachers with a master or PhD degree is bigger. 
VI. Production Function 
When looking at the available literature one realizes that there is little consensus regarding 
the effect of some inputs on students’ performance. Therefore, in order to provide some 
guidelines towards the expected signs of different inputs used in the model and exposed 
in the previous section, a production function estimated by Pereira (2010) using 2006 
PISA data for Portugal is presented. The choice of this paper instead of another relates to 
its timeliness, the use of data for Portugal and the similarity between the dependent 
variables used, as well as the possible independent variables.  
Pereira (2010) concludes on some of the most important determinants of attainment in 
Portugal, namely students’ characteristics, as female gender, which has a negative impact 
for Mathematics and positive for reading tests. Relatively to family background, Pereira 
settles the positive effect of a home environment propitious to learning, the significant 
role of parents’ occupations, especially for white collar/high skilled workers and the 
negative impact of being an immigrant. 
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Regarding school characteristics, he emphasizes the positive effect of school size – 
suggesting the existence of economies of scale – and proportion of girls on outcomes and 
the negative impact of repeaters. The usual employed variables to measure school 
resources, as average class size and student/teacher ratio do not appear to be significant 
inputs in the Portuguese education production function, as in most studies. 
Finally in the mentioned study, grade amplitude – calculated as the difference between 
the maximum and the minimum grades offered by the school – has a positive and 
significant impact at 10% significance level for Portuguese students taking PISA’s 
reading test; though no impact was observed for Mathematics tests. 
VII. Results 
Based on the general regression presented in Section IV and on the exposed in the 
previous section, several combinations of variables were tried, namely interchanging: 3rd 
cycle size with 9th grade size; parents’ job situation and occupation; immigrant status and 
if Portuguese was the pupil’s mother tongue; level of school subsidy and degree of family 
allowance. Additionally, variables that had no explanatory power, such as the proportion 
of girls in the 9th grade, were excluded from the regression. In the end, two very similar 
specifications proved to work best, one for each dependent variable – Mathematics and 
Portuguese scores. A summarized regression table is presented below23 and the 
subsequent analysis should be understood in ceteris paribus. Regressions 1 and 3 have 
no school specific characteristics; these were only added in regressions 2 and 4 for 
Portuguese and Mathematics test scores, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
23A complete table is presented in appendix II. 
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Table 2: Main Results 
  Test Scores: Portuguese Mathematics 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
gender (0=female) -3.779** -3.756*** -0.688*** -0.724*** 
computer (0=no access) 0.806*** 0.746*** - - 
internet (0=no access) - - 1.572*** 1.531*** 
school subsidy (0=none)      
 low -1.036*** -0.818*** -1.516*** -1.486*** 
 high -1.763*** -1.438*** -2.71*** -2.388*** 
immigrant (0=native)      
 2nd gen. -1.547*** -1.486** -2.149*** -2.795*** 
 1st gen. -0.818** -1.037** -0.704 -0.888 
father job situation (0=unemployed)      
 stay-at-home 0.387 -0.081 -2.331 -2.518 
 student -0.107 0.607 -4.699* -5.282* 
 retired 0.580 0.644 1.236*** 1.116* 
 employed 0.503** 0.536** 1.213*** 1.133*** 
 self-employed 0.808*** 0.79*** 1.827*** 1.689*** 
 employer 0.573* 0.646** 2.11*** 2.042*** 
father education (0=up to 9th grade)      
 up to high school or bachelor 1.595*** 1.492*** 1.864*** 1.952*** 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 4.324*** 4.103*** 5.819*** 5.94*** 
 master degree or PhD 5.455*** 5.046*** 6.885*** 6.887*** 
mother job situation 
(0=unemployed) 
     
 stay-at-home 0.44** 0.57*** 1.273*** 1.294*** 
 student 0.091 0.463 1.266 1.696 
 retired 0.359 0.048 -1.200 -1.234 
 employed 0.54*** 0.576*** 1.199*** 1.272*** 
 self-employed 0.376 0.487* 1.787*** 1.897*** 
 employer 0.736** 0.865** 2.021*** 2.133*** 
mother education (0=up to 9th 
grade) 
     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.92*** 1.807*** 1.773*** 1.728*** 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 5.422*** 5.264*** 6.452*** 6.481*** 
 master degree or PhD 5.92*** 5.593*** 7.254*** 7.258*** 
grade repetition -3.711*** -3.726*** -3.494*** -3.407*** 
6th grade Portuguese score 12.148*** 12.113*** - - 
6th grade Math score - - 15.728*** 15.751*** 
average teacher experience - 0.017 - 0.612*** 
average teacher experience squared - - - -0.019*** 
average teacher education - 1.212*** - 2.533*** 
average school subsidy - -2.98*** - -1.752*** 
9th grade size - -0.004*** - -0.006*** 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 0.382*** 0.555*** 1.058*** 1.437*** 
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reference groups in parenthesis 
District and academic years dummies used 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
*p-value<=0,1      **p-value<=0,05      ***p-value<=0,01 
 
1. Students’ characteristics 
When analyzing the results one can see that, on average, boys have worse grades than 
girls for both subjects, though for Portuguese the difference is more pronounced.  
Specific district effects also play a role, since almost all their coefficients are statistically 
significant for both 9th grade exams. The district chosen as baseline was the one with 
median test score closer to the population median, Lisbon. 
An interesting result is related to pupil’s immigrant status. A 2nd generation immigrant 
has, on average, a lower score in Mathematics exam compared to a native student; 
however, a 1st generation immigrant has a Mathematics proficiency level similar to a 
native, as the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at usual levels. In the 
Portuguese exam the reverse occurs, the coefficient is only statistically significant and 
negative for a 1st generation immigrant, while 2nd generation immigrant students seem to 
have, on average, a fairly equal score to a native student. The last situations suggests that 
the negative effect of the status attenuates, for Portuguese test scores, as students and their 
families have lived longer in the country. 
Grade repetition, which stands for the number of times the students failed grades in past 
academic life, has a negative (and significant for all usual levels) coefficient with a 
magnitude of over 3.4 values out of 100 for each failed year. Another variable with a 
strong effect is the test score of the 6th grade Mathematics (Portuguese) exam, 15.75 
(12.1) values. Bear in mind that 6th grade scores go from 1 to 5, thus an increase of 1 in 




2. Family background 
Parents’ education constitutes one of the most relevant variables in what concerns family 
background. It is positively correlated to the dependent variable and statistically different 
from zero for all usual significance levels. The latter control is related to parents’ job 
occupation, with a correlation of about 0.2794 and 0.0749 for mother’s and father’s 
education, respectively. Being a stay-at-home father, comparatively to being 
unemployed, has no effect in pupil’s attainment; contrarily, a stay-at-home mother has a 
positive effect. Going up in the scale, a more pronounced effect emerges for both parents’ 
job situations. 
Following Pereira (2010), parents’ job situation was, in an alternative model24, substituted 
by parents’ occupation, with a Spearman correlation coefficient with parents’ 
qualifications of approximately 0.5. As one moves up in the breakdown of parental 
occupation a positive effect on pupil’s test scores emerges, particularly for white-
collar/high skilled25 parents. 
School subsidy is related to family income and, as expected, the higher the degree of 
subsidy, the lower the grade of the student, on average, cp. and the coefficient is even 
lower for the Mathematics exam.  
3. School Characteristics 
Average teachers’ education and 9th grade size are significant for both Mathematics and 
Portuguese scores, the first with a positive influence and the second with a negative and 
marginal effect. Average teachers’ experience, as well as squared experience, have a 
significant and positive effect for Mathematics, but no effect for Portuguese. The reason 
                                                          
24The table for this regression is in appendix II. All coefficients are similar and only parents’ job situation was substituted. 
25For the Portuguese exam a dummy for white-collar was used instead of the usual categorical variable for parental occupation, as 
no difference appeared to exist between high and low skilled inside each collar category. Results are consistent with the exposed. 
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behind this result may be related to the higher difficulty associated with the first course, 
on average – national Mathematics averages are lower than Portuguese ones. Hence, a 
teacher with more years of experience has, in principle, developed teaching skills that 
enhance students’ comprehension of the contents, namely skills that translate into a higher 
value added in the study of Mathematics comparatively to Portuguese.  
In addition, the average school subsidy received by students in 9th grade at each school 
was included to control for peer effects. Its sign suggests that the larger the number of 
students receiving it and the higher the degree of the subsidy, the lower the score 
achieved. A higher average of this variable is related to poorer 9th grade population and, 
even, poorer neighborhoods in which the school may be located.  
Finally, the coefficient of interest has a positive sign, which is almost the triple for 
Mathematics relatively to Portuguese scores and significant at all usual levels. Therefore, 
one can conclude that, even though Basic Schools have students with worst backgrounds 
and prior achievement, as showed in Section V, this type of school has a bigger added 
value to their students than Secondary Schools. When comparing its coefficient between 
the regressions with and without school characteristics is clear that the impact increases. 
The last result suggests that, although Secondary Schools have teachers with higher 
qualifications and experience – which have a positive effect in the pupil’s test score – 
their value added to students is smaller, hence the effect of attending a Secondary School 
decreases relatively to frequent a Basic School. The same is to say that the effect of going 
to a Basic School increases. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient of interest remains significant, thus non-measurable factors 
are still in place. They may be related to the way teachers and school staff interact with 
students, as well as the fact that in Basic Schools 3rd cycle pupils are mixed with younger 
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colleagues from 5th and 6th grades, while in Secondary Schools they interact with older 
students. The latter fact is associated with exposure to risky behavior and more autonomy 
granted to students. For instances, Basic Schools have a stricter “entrance and exiting the 
school” policy during class time along with a bigger absenteeism control and report to 
pupil’s parents his missing days. As a result parental involvement may on average tend 
to be greater, straightening parent-teacher relations, bonding their educational goals, 
which has a positive effect on students’ attainment as argued by Berlin and Cienkus 
(1989). Moreover, 9th grade in a Basic School constitutes the end of a student’s life in that 
institution, while in Secondary Schools the 9th grade is no more than a transition to a more 
relevant cycle – high school. To finish, students face a transitional environment when 
switching from Basic to Secondary Schools in 7th grade, while the environment and staff 
is the same when they do not change schools between cycles, making the transition 
smoother. This may suggest why Basic Schools are more effective than Secondary ones. 
Furthermore, in order to investigate if Basic School effectiveness affects all students in 
the same way, especially the ones in the tails, a Quantile regression was performed in 
each quartile. A table with the coefficient of interest is presented below.26 
Table 3: Quantile Regression Results 
  Whole Sample Q1 Median Q3 
Math Test Scores 
T 1.437 1.530 1.613 1.286 
CI95% [1.087301;1.786391] [1.074727;1.985285] [1.174427;2.051537] [0.7995818;1.771806] 
Portuguese Test Scores 
T 0.555 0.836 0.429 0.447 
CI95% [0.2945939;0.8150754] [0.4793755;1.192531] [0.0960622;0.7624965] [0.0807577;0.8131696] 
 
                                                          
26 The whole regression is in appendix III. Results for remaining variables are very similar to the ones in the main regression.  
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All coefficients are statistically significant at usual levels and there is evidence that, for 
the Portuguese exam, the students’ quartile that benefits the most from being in a Basic 
School, comparatively to a Secondary, is the lowest. Therefore, students with worst prior 
conditions, as parents with lower education, with inferior grades in the 6th grade exam 
and so forth seem to be the ones that gain the most from attending a Basic School. On the 
other hand, for Mathematics, the pupils that apparently benefit the most are the ones 
around the second quartile. Nevertheless, students in the first quartile are also associated 
with a higher point estimate than the one for the whole sample. Given the 95% Confidence 
Interval, it is not possible to argue that the population’s effect varies for each quartile. 
VIII. Limitations and Further Research 
The data was cleaned27 and organized, however coding errors are natural in data of this 
kind, as its construction behaves as the one in the survey data. Fortunately, given the large 
sample size, one may agree that in most cases there are no recording problems and that 
possible implications are negligible.  
In addition to the work presented in this essay, effectiveness of other school types that 
also provide 7th, 8th and 9th grades may be evaluated in comparison to Basic Schools, as 
fully integrated schools (offer from the 1st to the 12th grade), partially integrated (teach 
from the 1st to the 9th) and Basic Schools with high school (provide from the 5th to the 
12th grade). The last type combines Basic and Secondary Schools and, hence, it may be 
interesting to analyze if this school type takes advantage of the best features of each type 
analyzed previously. Note that other grade combinations are possible and exist due to 
decisions made by geographic school sets, as mentioned before, but those combinations 
tend to be very volatile, making its evaluation difficult. 
                                                          
27 Some elementary checks, as descriptive and summary statistics, were analyzed in order to ensure that variables were defined in 
proper intervals and scale. Some listwise deletion has to be performed as well. 
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Another possible extension to the analysis performed is to follow each student up to the 
end of Secondary School and see if there are systematic differences across 12th grade 
national test scores between students who attended a Basic School during 7th, 8th and 9th 
grades and the ones that did not go through this change and started already their 3rd cycle 
in a Secondary School. To push even further, one could trace these students after they 
enter the labor market and see if, in fact, their wages have significant differences.  
As a final point, it is still necessary to understand which factors make Basic Schools 
indeed more effective. Some possibilities were pointed out, but a deeper analysis is 
necessary. This may be developed alongside with other fields that also study teacher-
student-parent interaction, as Psychology and Sociology, since these two disciplines share 
some points of interest regarding education with Economics, such as measuring scholastic 
performance, analyzing the education production process and formulating educational 
policies. 
IX. Conclusions 
There are different types of schools providing lower secondary education in Portugal. 
Particularly in large cities students can make lower Secondary Schooling on Basic 
Schools or move to Secondary Schools with lower secondary level. This situation arose 
organically, as mandatory schooling increased in later decades of the 20th century. 
The purpose of this essay was to analyse whether there are systematic and significant 
differences in the performance of the students of these two different schools, as a first 
look at this particular situation. In case they exist, two possible driving mechanisms may 
be in place: teachers’ and students’ characteristics. The first one comprises teachers’ 
quality, their teaching-to-the-test approach, the degree of demanding requirements, 
among others. The second is related to pupil’s family background, home environment, 
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innate ability, autonomy and responsibility and how they interacted with younger or older 
colleagues. 
To study this question, standardized test scores of national exams performed by 9th grade 
Portuguese pupils were collected for three academic years, as the ultimate criterion for 
assessing the effectiveness of any school reform is the extent to which it improves actual 
academic achievement (Hanushek 1986). The analysis of the descriptive statistics led to 
the conclusion that Secondary Schools have better teachers as well as students, which are 
positively correlated to test scores. However, when test scores from standardized exams 
were regressed in a binary variable that accounted for school type, controlling for pupils’ 
and schools’ characteristics, going to a Basic School comparatively to attending a 
Secondary School was beneficial for students, enhancing his performance in both 
Portuguese and Mathematics exams. The main conclusion is, then, that systematic 
differences exist between Basic and secondary Schools. Some possible explanations were 
brought forward: the different way the two school types face students in 9th grade, the 
way teachers and school staff interact with them and the degree of students’ autonomy 
may play an important role in explaining this differences. Further research is needed to 
conclude on the non-measured determinants of Basic School effectiveness, which may 
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Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4: Test Scores - Descriptive Statistics 
Mathematics exam scores 
School Classification Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Secondary Schools (SC) 33653 49.401 24.603 0 100 
Basic Schools (BC) 60184 47.148 23.566 0 100 
      
Portuguese exam scores 
School Classification Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Secondary Schools (SC) 33781 55.717 16.782 0 100 
Basic Schools (BC) 60231 54.046 16.473 1 100 
 
Table 5: Schools summary statistics  - Controls 
 Secondary Basic 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
size of 3rd cycle 105818 370.211 153.502 183313 345.937 129.235 
size of 9th grade 105818 118.870 47.937 183313 103.388 42.163 
proportion of girls in 9th grade 105818 0.507 0.059 183313 0.513 0.060 
range* 105818 6 0 183313 5 0 
% teachers that only lecture 3rd cycle  105818 0.169 0.074 183313 0.374 0.079 
weekly hours of support to 3rd cycle 101362 0.022 0.029 162559 0.004 0.021 
relative support to 3rd cycle** 39449 0.000076 0.000140 62440 0.000012 0.000062 
average teacher education*** 101362 3.027 0.058 162559 2.936 0.058 
teachers with bachelor degree 101362 0.053 0.033 162559 0.093 0.042 
% teachers with undergraduate degree 101362 0.846 0.050 162559 0.835 0.053 
% teachers with masters or PhD 101362 0.090 0.038 162559 0.053 0.024 
average teachers experience**** 101362 17.855 2.694 162559 16.503 2.680 
average teacher experience squared 101362 431.422 99.543 162559 385.047 99.650 
*nº of grades taught in the school 
**see foot note 20 
***highest and latest degree reported by the teacher; see foot note 17 
****in years 
 
Table 6: Students summary statistics  - Controls 
 Secondary Basic 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Female Gender 105 818 0.483 0.500 183313 0.471 0.499 
Immigrant 105818 0.048 0.281 183313 0.064 0.331 
Portuguese 6th grade score 105818 3.469 0.665 183313 3.398 0.651 
Math 6th grade score 105818 3.303 0.842 183311 3.209 0.820 
% Failed 6th grade math exam 105818 0.125 0.330 183313 0.140 0.347 
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% Failed 6th grade portuguese exam 105818 0.013 0.111 183313 0.016 0.126 
% Failed 9th grade 105818 0.083 0.276 183313 0.090 0.286 
% Abandoned school 105818 1.89E-05 0.004 183313 3.27E-05 0.006 
% Absenteeism 105818 1.89E-05 0.004 183313 0.000 0.000 
Grade repetition* 105818 0.210 0.554 183313 0.216 0.555 
Has access to computer at home 105818 0.781 0.414 183313 0.810 0.393 
Has access to internet at home 105818 0.694 0.461 183313 0.657 0.475 
Degree of family allowance** 105 818 0.674 1.045 183313 0.969 1.135 
Degree of school subsidy** 105818 0.453 0.734 183313 0.604 0.795 
Guardian's education*** 87 695 0.930 0.784 165325 0.722 0.732 
Father's education*** 83650 0.794 0.770 157170 0.604 0.702 
Mother's education*** 87405 0.912 0.783 164194 0.700 0.730 
Guardian's occupation# 105 448 2.413 2.077 183145 2.398 1.952 
Father's occupation# 103 381 2.444 1.938 179217 2.448 1.747 
Mother's occupation# 104 836 2.412 2.080 181871 2.344 1.966 
Guardian's job situation## 86 777 3.434 1.476 168915 3.315 1.562 
Father's job situation## 82 136 4.000 1.053 159266 3.983 1.114 
Mother's job situation## 86 308 3.335 1.530 167119 3.201 1.611 
Guardian is unemployed 105 448 0.160 0.367 183147 0.215 0.411 
Father is unemployed 103 381 0.039 0.194 179217 0.049 0.217 
Mother is unemployed 104 836 0.185 0.388 181871 0.245 0.430 
*see foot note 9 
**see foot note 10 
***see foot note 11 
#see foot note 14 














Appendix II: Main Regressions 
Table 7: Main Regression 
 Test Scores: Portuguese  Mathematics 
  R-squared 0.442 R-squared 0.5093 
Variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
gender (0=female) -3.756 0.000 -0.724 0.000 
computer (0=no access) 0.746 0.000   
internet (0=no access)   1.531 0.000 
district (Lisbon)     
 oversea 2.441 0.515 -5.309 0.282 
 Aveiro 1.848 0.000 3.461 0.000 
 Beja -1.237 0.031 1.990 0.008 
 Braga 1.468 0.000 3.990 0.000 
 Bragança 0.623 0.283 1.993 0.013 
 Castelo Branco 1.938 0.000 2.282 0.001 
 Coimbra 2.430 0.000 4.122 0.000 
 Évora -0.411 0.399 -2.542 0.000 
 Faro -1.783 0.000 0.085 0.815 
 Guarda 0.358 0.389 3.443 0.000 
 Leiria 0.540 0.048 2.586 0.000 
 Portalegre -1.447 0.001 -4.162 0.000 
 Porto 1.375 0.000 2.402 0.000 
 Santarém -0.280 0.298 1.307 0.000 
 Setúbal -1.737 0.000 -1.296 0.000 
 Viana do Castelo 1.936 0.000 6.197 0.000 
 Vila Real -0.351 0.338 2.358 0.000 
 Viseu 2.146 0.000 3.685 0.000 
school subsidy (0=none)     
 low -0.819 0.000 -1.486 0.000 
 high -1.438 0.000 -2.388 0.000 
immigrant (0=native)     
 2nd gen. -1.486 0.015 -2.795 0.000 
 1st gen. -1.037 0.013 -0.888 0.105 
father job situation (0=unemployed)     
 stay-at-home -0.081 0.975 -2.518 0.412 
 student 0.607 0.785 -5.282 0.058 
 retired 0.644 0.142 1.116 0.066 
 employed 0.536 0.024 1.133 0.000 
 self-employed 0.790 0.004 1.689 0.000 
 employer 0.646 0.047 2.042 0.000 
father education (0=up to 9th grade)     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.492 0.000 1.952 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 4.103 0.000 5.940 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 5.046 0.000 6.887 0.000 
mother job situation (0=unemployed)     
 stay-at-home 0.557 0.009 1.294 0.000 
 student 0.463 0.725 1.696 0.286 
 retired 0.048 0.939 -1.234 0.158 
 employed 0.576 0.002 1.272 0.000 
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 self-employed 0.487 0.067 1.897 0.000 
 employer 0.865 0.025 2.133 0.000 
mother education (0=up to 9th grade)     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.807 0.000 1.728 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 5.264 0.000 6.481 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 5.593 0.000 7.258 0.000 
grade repetition* -3.726 0.000 -3.407 0.000 
6th grade Portuguese score 12.113 0.000   
6th grade Math score   15.751 0.000 
academic year (2009/10)     
 2010/11 -10.028 0.000 -14.822 0.000 
 2011/12 16.679 0.000 12.472 0.000 
average teacher experience 0.017 0.429 0.612 0.000 
average teacher experience squared - - -0.019 0.000 
average teacher education 1.212 0.057 2.533 0.004 
average school subsidy -2.980 0.000 -1.752 0.000 
9th grade size -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 0.555 0.000 1.437 0.000 
constant  24.515 0.000 -16.069 0.000 
reference groups in parenthesis 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
*number of times a student failed 
 
Table 8: Alternative Regression (to be continued) 
Mathematics Test Scores (9th grade) R-squared 0.5096 
Variable coeff. sd.dev. t-stat p-value 
gender (0=female) -0.686 0.127 -5.400 0.000 
internet (0=no access) 1.447 0.143 10.140 0.000 
district (Lisbon)     
 oversea -6.361 4.271 -1.490 0.136 
 Aveiro 3.651 0.286 12.780 0.000 
 Beja 1.902 0.729 2.610 0.009 
 Braga 3.916 0.263 14.900 0.000 
 Bragança 1.426 0.774 1.840 0.065 
 Castelo Branco 2.548 0.637 4.000 0.000 
 Coimbra 4.227 0.378 11.180 0.000 
 Évora -2.563 0.612 -4.190 0.000 
 Faro 0.003 0.351 0.010 0.994 
 Guarda 3.599 0.572 6.290 0.000 
 Leiria 2.729 0.362 7.540 0.000 
 Portalegre -3.833 0.533 -7.200 0.000 
 Porto 2.348 0.229 10.270 0.000 
 Santarém 1.432 0.342 4.190 0.000 
 Setúbal -1.313 0.278 -4.720 0.000 
 Viana do Castelo 6.171 0.528 11.700 0.000 
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 Vila Real 2.610 0.472 5.530 0.000 
 Viseu 3.865 0.367 10.520 0.000 
school subsidy (0=none)     
 low -1.406 0.182 -7.740 0.000 
 high -2.476 0.197 -12.560 0.000 
immigrant (0=native)     
 2nd gen. -2.689 0.734 -3.670 0.000 
 1st gen. -0.505 0.509 -0.990 0.321 
father occupation     
 blue collar/low skilled 0.112 0.263 0.430 0.671 
 blue collar/high skilled 0.503 0.241 2.090 0.037 
 white collar/ low skilled 1.039 0.256 4.050 0.000 
 white collar/ high skilled 1.809 0.268 6.760 0.000 
father education (0=up to 9th grade)     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.609 0.175 9.200 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 4.901 0.293 16.700 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 5.575 0.579 9.630 0.000 
mother occupation     
 blue collar/low skilled -0.216 0.239 -0.900 0.367 
 blue collar/high skilled 0.374 0.251 1.490 0.136 
 white collar/ low skilled 0.485 0.183 2.660 0.008 
 white collar/ high skilled 1.536 0.250 6.150 0.000 
mother education (0=up to 9th grade)     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.506 0.177 8.510 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 5.618 0.281 20.020 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 6.101 0.615 9.920 0.000 
grade repetition* -3.426 0.139 -24.600 0.000 
6th grade Mathematics score 15.728 0.081 194.340 0.000 
academic year (2009/10)     
 2010/11 
-
14.897 0.132 -112.890 0.000 
 2011/12 12.334 0.616 20.020 0.000 
average teacher experience 0.637 0.101 6.310 0.000 
average teacher experience squared -0.020 0.003 -7.100 0.000 
average teacher education 2.064 0.838 2.460 0.014 
average school subsidy -1.613 0.393 -4.100 0.000 
9th grade size -0.006 0.002 -3.510 0.000 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 1.453 0.172 8.470 0.000 
constant 
-
12.140 4.360 -2.780 0.005 
reference groups in parenthesis 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 




Table 8: Alternative Regression (continued) 
Portuguese Test Scores (9th grade) R-squared 0.5096 
Variable coeff. sd.dev. t-stat p-value 
gender (0=female) -3.772 0.115 -32.750 0.000 
computer (0=no access) 0.816 0.158 5.180 0.000 
district (Lisbon)     
 oversea -1.361 4.201 -0.320 0.746 
 Aveiro 2.054 0.246 8.350 0.000 
 Beja -1.527 0.649 -2.350 0.019 
 Braga 1.768 0.230 7.680 0.000 
 Bragança 1.228 0.691 1.780 0.076 
 Castelo Branco 1.886 0.551 3.420 0.001 
 Coimbra 3.098 0.322 9.620 0.000 
 Évora -0.115 0.536 -0.220 0.830 
 Faro -1.846 0.293 -6.300 0.000 
 Guarda 1.078 0.478 2.250 0.024 
 Leiria 0.783 0.308 2.540 0.011 
 Portalegre -1.405 0.472 -2.970 0.003 
 Porto 1.541 0.203 7.590 0.000 
 Santarém 0.014 0.306 0.050 0.963 
 Setúbal -1.607 0.240 -6.710 0.000 
 Viana do Castelo 2.585 0.463 5.580 0.000 
 Vila Real -1.013 0.463 -2.190 0.029 
 Viseu 2.720 0.337 8.070 0.000 
school subsidy (0=none)     
 low -0.771 0.162 -4.770 0.000 
 high -1.597 0.199 -8.040 0.000 
immigrant (0=native)     
 2nd gen. -1.176 0.738 -1.590 0.111 
 1st gen. -1.071 0.485 -2.210 0.027 
father education     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.040 0.155 6.700 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 3.452 0.244 14.180 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 4.732 0.502 9.420 0.000 
mother education (0=up to 9th grade)     
 up to high school or bachelor 1.463 0.162 9.050 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 4.729 0.229 20.630 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 5.137 0.531 9.680 0.000 
white collar mother 0.800 0.160 5.000 0.000 
white collar father 1.060 0.144 7.340 0.000 
grade repetition* -3.710 0.138 -26.810 0.000 
6th grade portuguese score 12.044 0.100 121.040 0.000 
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academic year (2009/10)     
 2010/11 -10.073 0.118 -85.490 0.000 
 2011/12 16.394 0.557 29.430 0.000 
average teacher experience -0.022 0.026 -0.830 0.407 
average teacher education 2.029 1.048 1.940 0.053 
average school subsidy -2.581 0.360 -7.170 0.000 
9th grade size -0.004 0.002 -2.240 0.025 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 0.541 0.161 3.370 0.001 
constant 25.354 3.364 7.540 0.000 
reference groups in parenthesis 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 





















Appendix III: Quantile Regressions 
Table 9: Quantile Regression Results (to be continued) 
Math Test Scores 
   Q1 Median Q3 
Variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
gender (0=female) -0.676 0.000 -0.755 0.000 -0.667 0.000 
internet (0=no access) 1.650 0.000 1.625 0.000 1.357 0.000 
        
district (Lisbon)       
 oversea -2.141 0.871 -3.338 0.000 -1.539 0.941 
 Aveiro 3.459 0.000 3.526 0.000 3.629 0.000 
 Beja 3.806 0.000 1.341 0.168 2.707 0.005 
 Braga 4.338 0.000 3.870 0.000 3.775 0.000 
 Bragança 1.442 0.165 2.510 0.083 3.456 0.006 
 Castelo Branco 2.764 0.009 2.166 0.013 2.990 0.000 
 Coimbra 4.399 0.000 4.184 0.000 4.010 0.000 
 Évora -3.158 0.002 -2.977 0.000 -2.935 0.001 
 Faro 0.265 0.603 -0.067 0.874 -0.181 0.703 
 Guarda 3.979 0.000 3.230 0.000 3.586 0.000 
 Leiria 2.921 0.000 2.315 0.000 2.266 0.000 
 Portalegre -2.848 0.000 -4.966 0.000 -4.814 0.000 
 Porto 2.523 0.000 2.631 0.000 2.414 0.000 
 Santarém 1.759 0.000 1.096 0.016 1.122 0.027 
 Setúbal -1.376 0.000 -1.677 0.000 -1.513 0.000 
 Viana do Castelo 7.297 0.000 6.767 0.000 6.050 0.000 
 Vila Real 2.749 0.000 1.717 0.003 2.357 0.000 
 Viseu 3.587 0.000 3.718 0.000 3.750 0.000 
school subsidy (0=none)       
 low -1.717 0.000 -1.663 0.000 -1.090 0.000 
 high -2.664 0.000 -2.572 0.000 -2.190 0.000 
immigrant (0=native)       
 2nd gen. -1.413 0.000 -3.151 0.001 -3.674 0.002 
 1st gen. -1.401 0.007 -0.667 0.395 0.048 0.933 
father job situation (0=unemployed)       
 stay-at-home -1.371 0.623 -5.176 0.108 -3.400 0.005 
 student -6.513 0.455 -4.839 0.473 -4.324 0.337 
 retired 0.900 0.197 1.049 0.148 1.085 0.179 
 employed 1.350 0.001 1.086 0.008 1.162 0.019 
 self-employed 1.858 0.000 1.758 0.000 1.668 0.002 
 employer 2.361 0.000 1.977 0.000 2.303 0.000 
father education (0=up to 9th grade)       
 up to high school or bachelor 2.000 0.000 1.808 0.000 2.051 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 6.873 0.000 5.678 0.000 5.335 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 7.730 0.000 6.420 0.000 6.660 0.000 
mother job situation (0=unemployed)       
 stay-at-home 1.228 0.000 1.807 0.000 1.287 0.005 
 student 2.559 0.490 1.966 0.399 1.660 0.478 
 retired -1.381 0.067 -1.420 0.298 -1.511 0.319 
 employed 1.507 0.000 1.614 0.000 1.139 0.004 
 self-employed 1.896 0.000 2.108 0.000 2.046 0.000 
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 employer 3.281 0.000 2.189 0.000 1.395 0.045 
mother education (0=up to 9th grade)       
 up to high school or bachelor 1.438 0.000 2.261 0.000 1.922 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 7.388 0.000 7.489 0.000 5.950 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 8.891 0.000 8.372 0.000 6.414 0.000 
grade repetition* -2.186 0.000 -3.370 0.000 -4.866 0.000 
6th grade Math score 16.146 0.000 16.712 0.000 15.859 0.000 
academic year (2009/10)       
 2010/11 -15.915 0.000 -15.415 0.000 -14.242 0.000 
 2011/12 13.209 0.000 9.616 0.000 9.749 0.000 
average teacher experience 0.576 0.000 0.709 0.000 0.586 0.000 
average teacher experience squared -0.017 0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.020 0.000 
average teacher education 1.824 0.114 2.910 0.008 2.294 0.052 
average school subsidy -1.746 0.001 -2.094 0.000 -2.003 0.000 
9th grade size -0.007 0.004 -0.009 0.000 -0.007 0.002 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 1.530 0.000 1.613 0.000 1.286 0.000 
constant  -25.917 0.000 -21.479 0.000 -2.269 0.714 
reference groups in parenthesis 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
*number of times a student failed 
  
Table 9: Quantile Regression Results (continued) 
Portuguese Test Scores 
  Q1 Median Q3 
Variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
gender (0=female) -4.154 0.000 -3.675 0.000 -3.591 0.000 
computer (0=no access) 0.838 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.669 0.000 
        
district (Lisbon)       
 oversea 5.691 0.177 4.899 0.713 4.670 0.002 
 Aveiro 2.041 0.000 1.903 0.000 1.827 0.000 
 Beja -2.232 0.005 -0.650 0.406 -1.408 0.034 
 Braga 1.265 0.000 1.541 0.000 1.815 0.000 
 Bragança -0.334 0.614 1.266 0.094 0.820 0.363 
 Castelo Branco 1.996 0.007 1.994 0.000 1.765 0.028 
 Coimbra 2.025 0.000 2.381 0.000 2.786 0.000 
 Évora -1.083 0.043 -0.489 0.235 -0.124 0.813 
 Faro -1.592 0.000 -2.124 0.000 -2.030 0.000 
 Guarda 0.077 0.894 0.319 0.516 0.440 0.360 
 Leiria 0.722 0.059 0.352 0.306 0.093 0.809 
 Portalegre -1.937 0.012 -0.721 0.199 -1.604 0.003 
 Porto 1.089 0.000 1.403 0.000 1.690 0.000 
 Santarém -0.514 0.192 -0.285 0.421 0.137 0.750 
 Setúbal -1.647 0.000 -2.149 0.000 -1.520 0.000 
 Viana do Castelo 2.071 0.000 1.800 0.000 1.585 0.022 
 Vila Real -0.279 0.566 -0.653 0.146 -0.582 0.248 
 Viseu 2.272 0.000 2.408 0.000 2.267 0.000 
school subsidy (0=none)       
 low -0.872 0.000 -0.815 0.000 -0.790 0.000 
 high -1.595 0.000 -1.409 0.000 -1.392 0.000 
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immigrant (0=native)       
 2nd gen. -2.144 0.000 -1.499 0.018 -1.372 0.076 
 1st gen. -1.583 0.001 -1.143 0.032 -1.428 0.025 
father job situation (0=unemployed)       
 stay-at-home 4.638 0.756 -0.863 0.063 2.062 0.771 
 student 2.319 0.171 -0.072 0.844 -1.849 0.555 
 retired 1.102 0.107 0.582 0.379 0.750 0.215 
 employed 0.890 0.003 0.546 0.052 -0.072 0.836 
 self-employed 0.957 0.008 0.776 0.017 0.270 0.497 
 employer 0.835 0.054 0.520 0.180 0.304 0.517 
father education (0=up to 9th grade)       
 up to high school or bachelor 1.476 0.000 1.789 0.000 1.624 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 3.951 0.000 4.486 0.000 4.427 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 4.956 0.000 5.748 0.000 5.715 0.000 
mother job situation (0=unemployed)       
 stay-at-home 0.497 0.122 0.429 0.079 0.517 0.073 
 student -0.546 0.751 1.636 0.467 0.775 0.204 
 retired 0.017 0.985 0.543 0.527 0.320 0.667 
 employed 0.894 0.001 0.580 0.006 0.446 0.077 
 self-employed 0.484 0.186 0.708 0.019 0.561 0.114 
 employer 0.615 0.246 0.610 0.175 1.175 0.039 
mother education (0=up to 9th grade)       
 up to high school or bachelor 1.560 0.000 1.875 0.000 2.035 0.000 
 undergraduate or post-graduate 4.840 0.000 5.471 0.000 5.721 0.000 
 master degree or PhD 4.864 0.000 5.184 0.000 6.119 0.000 
grade repetition* -3.595 0.000 -3.407 0.000 -3.956 0.000 
6th grade Portuguese score 11.894 0.000 1.250 0.000 12.630 0.000 
academic year (2009/10)       
 2010/11 -10.431 0.000 -10.412 0.000 -9.715 0.000 
 2011/12 16.691 0.000 16.071 0.000 14.614 0.000 
average teacher experience 0.081 0.006 0.029 0.273 -0.046 0.130 
average teacher education 1.257 0.156 2.194 0.006 0.941 0.295 
average school subsidy -3.385 0.000 -3.138 0.000 -2.585 0.000 
9th grade size -0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.008 -0.005 0.014 
T (1=Basic, 0=Secondary) 0.836 0.000 0.429 0.012 0.447 0.017 
constant  16.210 0.001 27.897 0.000 30.774 0.000 
reference groups in parenthesis 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
*number of times a student failed 
 
